Its been just over two months since Kathleen Hicks stepped down as US deputy secretary of defense. As the highest-ranking woman in Pentagon history, Hicks shaped US military posture through an era defined by renewed competition between powerful countries and a scramble to modernize defense technology. Shes currently taking a break before jumping into her (still unannounced) next act. Its been refreshing, she saysbut disconnecting isnt easy. She continues to monitor defense developments closely and expresses concern over potential setbacks: New administrations have new priorities, and thats completely expected, but I do worry about just stalling out on progress that we've built over a number of administrations. Over the past three decades, Hicks has watched the Pentagon transformpolitically, strategically, and technologically. She entered government in the 1990s at the tail end of the Cold War, when optimism and a belief in global cooperation still dominated US foreign policy. But that optimism dimmed. After 9/11, the focus shifted to counterterrorism and nonstate actors. Then came Russias resurgence and Chinas growing assertiveness. Hicks took two previous breaks from government workthe first to complete a PhD at MIT and the second to join the think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where she focused on defense strategy. By the time I returned in 2021, she says, there was one actorthe PRC (Peoples Republic of China)that had the capability and the will to really contest the international system as its set up. In this conversation with MIT Technology Review, Hicks reflects on how the Pentagon is adaptingor failing to adaptto a new era of geopolitical competition. She discusses Chinas technological rise, the future of AI in warfare, and her signature initiative, Replicator, a Pentagon initiative to rapidly field thousands of low-cost autonomous systems such as drones. Youve described China as a talented fast follower. Do you still believe that, especially given recent developments in AI and other technologies? Yes, I do. China is the biggest pacing challenge we face, which means it sets the pace for most capability areas for what we need to be able to defeat to deter them. For example, surface maritime capability, missile capability, stealth fighter capability. They set their minds to achieving a certain capability, they tend to get there, and they tend to get there even faster. That said, they have a substantial amount of corruption, and they havent been engaged in a real conflict or combat operation in the way that Western militaries have trained for or been involved in, and that is a huge X factor in how effective they would be. China has made major technological strides, and the old narrative of its being a follower is breaking downnot just in commercial tech, but more broadly. Do you think the US still holds a strategic advantage? I would never want to underestimate their abilityor any nations abilityto innovate organically when they put their minds to it. But I still think its a helpful comparison to look at the US model. Because were a system of free minds, free people, and free markets, we have the potential to generate much more innovation culturally and organically than a statist model does. Thats our advantageif we can realize it. China is ahead in manufacturing, especially when it comes to drones and other unmanned systems. How big a problem is that for US defense, and can the US catch up? I do think its a massive problem. When we were conceiving Replicator, one of the big concerns was that DJI had just jumped way out ahead on the manufacturing side, and the US had been left behind. A lot of manufacturers here believe they can catch up if given the right contractsand I agree with that. We also spent time identifying broader supply-chain vulnerabilities. Microelectronics was a big one. Critical minerals. Batteries. People sometimes think batteries are just about electrification, but theyre fundamental across our systemseven on ships in the Navy. When it comes to drones specifically, I actually think its a solvable problem. The issue isnt complexity. Its just about getting enough mass of contracts to scale up manufacturing. If we do that, I believe the US can absolutely compete. The Replicator drone program was one of your key initiatives. It promised a very fast timelineespecially compared with the typical defense acquisition cycle. Was that achievable? How is that progressing? When I left in January, we had still lined up for proving out this summer, and I still believe we should see some completion this year. I hope Congress will stay very engaged in trying to ensure that the capability, in fact, comes to fruition. Even just this week with Secretary [Pete] Hegseth out in the Indo-Pacific, he made some passing reference to the [US Indo-Pacific Command] commander, Admiral [Samuel] Paparo, having the flexibility to create the capability needed, and that gives me a lot of confidence of consistency. Can you talk about how Replicator fits into broader efforts to speed up defense innovation? Whats actually changing inside the system? Traditionally, defense acquisition is slow and serialone step after another, which works for massive, long-term systems like submarines. But for things like drones, that just doesnt cut it. With Replicator, we aimed to shift to a parallel model: integrating hardware, software, policy, and testing all at once. Thats how you get speedby breaking down silos and running things simultaneously. Its not about Move fast and break things. You still have to test and evaluate responsibly. But this approach shows we can move faster without sacrificing accountabilityand thats a big cultural shift. How important is AI to the future of national defense? Its central. The future of warfare will be about speed and precisiondecision advantage. AI helps enable that. Its about integrating capabilities to create faster, more accurate decision-making: for achieving military objectives, for reducing civilian casualties, and for being able to deter effectively. But weve also emphasized responsible AI. If its not safe, its not going to be effective. Thats been a key focus across administrations. What about generative AI specifically? Does it have real strategic significance yet, or is it still in the experimental phase? It does have significance, especially for decision-making and efficiency. We had an effort called Project Lima where we looked at use cases for generative AIwhere it might be most useful, and what the rules for responsible use should look like. Some of the biggest use may come first in the back officehuman resources, auditing, logistics. But the ability to use generative AI to create a network of capability around unmanned systems or information exchange, either in Replicator or JADC2? Thats where it becomes a real advantage. But those back-office areas are where I would anticipate to see big gains first. [Editors note: JADC2 is Joint All-Domain Command and Control, a DOD initiative to connect sensors from all branches of the armed forces into a unified network powered by artificial intelligence.] In recent years, weve seen more tech industry figures stepping into national defense conversationssometimes pushing strong political views or advocating for deregulation. How do you see Silicon Valleys growing influence on US defense strategy? Theres a long history of innovation in this country coming from outside the governmentpeople who look at big national problems and want to help solve them. That kind of engagement is good, especially when their technical expertise lines up with real national security needs. But thats not just one stakeholder group. A healthy democracy includes others, tooworkers, environmental voices, allies. We need to reconcile all of that through a functioning democratic process. Thats the only way this works. How do you view the involvement of prominent tech entrepreneurs, such as Elon Musk, in shaping national defense policies? I believe its not healthy for any democracy when a single individual wields more power than their technical expertise or official role justifies. We need strong institutions, not just strong personalities. The US has long attracted top STEM talent from around the world, including many researchers from China. But in recent years, immigration hurdles and heightened scrutiny have made it harder for foreign-born scientists to stay. Do you see this as a threat to US innovation? I think you have to be confident that you have a secure research community to do secure work. But much of the work that underpins national defense thats STEM-related research doesnt need to be tightly secured in that way, and it really is dependent on a diverse ecosystem of talent. Cutting off talent pipelines is like eating our seed corn. Programs like H-1B visas are really important. And its not just about international talentwe need to make sure people from underrepresented communities here in the US see national security as a space where they can contribute. If they dont feel valued or trusted, theyre less likely to come in and stay. What do you see as the biggest challenge the Department of Defense faces today? I do think the trustor the lack of itis a big challenge. Whether its trust in government broadly or specific concerns like military spending, audits, or politicization of the uniformed military, that issue manifests in everything DOD is trying to get done. It affects our ability to work with Congress, with allies, with industry, and with the American people. If people dont believe youre working in their interest, its hard to get anything done.