This story was originally published in The Highlight, Voxs member-exclusive magazine. To get early access to member-exclusive stories every month, join the Vox Membership program today.Six months ago, young Democrats were preparing for a very different conversation. They were breathing a sigh of relief after Joe Biden formally dropped out of the 2024 presidential contest. Gen Z, some said, was ready to feel the #Kamalove and break with the past that Biden represented. The flurry of Brat summer and coconut-tree memes that filled social media platforms was surely proof that there was a latent enthusiasm for Harris among the youth. It was Bidens sputtering candidacy that had depressed that energy over the last year.The organizations dedicated to engaging, mobilizing, and speaking to and for various youth constituencies thought this reset and the ensuing summer of good feelings would make their civic and campaign efforts much less difficult. The work could now focus more on turning out the youth for a fresh candidate instead of persuading those who had been disillusioned by Biden to drag their way to the voting booth. This election was now more a matter of simply getting youth to show up.At least, thats what was expected.Heres what happened instead. Donald Trumps favorability among young Americans continued to improve, trending up or remaining steady as it had been for most of the last year. He continued his strategy of campaigning through influencers and on unconventional media platforms and podcasts, betting his celebrity appeal and anti-establishment message would reach voters, especially young men, who didnt usually care for politics.On the Democratic side, Harriss honeymoon period ended. The campaign would turn more negative, and polls showed Harris reaching a ceiling in youth support.The end result was a rightward lurch by the youngest cohort of voters. Voters under 30 still preferred Harris to Trump, but by just 4 points, according to an analysis of AP VoteCast data by Tufts Universitys Center for Information & Research on Civic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE). That was a tinier margin than the 25-point advantage Biden had in 2020 and that Hillary Clinton had in 2016 (about 30 points). (VoteCast differs from traditional exit polls, which can be notoriously unreliable, but is still preliminary.) So whats driving Democrats and young voters apart?Did the Democrats and their allies in the youth organizing and activist group space misdiagnose what the youth actually felt and wanted? Were young progressives right that Harris, and Biden before her, should have tacked further to the left to excite and turn out their base? Or do those young-voter organizing groups share the blame for pushing the candidates to address progressive ideological priorities instead of kitchen-table issues?For answers, I talked to youth leaders, organizers, and those who followed their work. I also reflected on my own coverage of the youth vote over the last two years. Combined with election results and post-election polling, these data points paint a nuanced picture of whats underlying Gen Zs rightward lurch: a deep disconnect between the Democratic Party and its youth allies on one hand and young adults on the other.See, theres a fundamental divide between the young people who care about Democratic politics and the kind of people they were trying to persuade.Many of their turnout targets simply didnt trust institutions or the status quo like organizers and young Democrats did. They existed in different information bubbles and media ecosystems, missing persuasion efforts including memes, celebrity endorsements, or digital organizing. Or they just didnt care enough about the complex issues youth activists were talking about, when their concerns were much more basic, like how much a paycheck could afford, whether Democrats could be trusted to help them get ahead financially, and whether Harris or Trump would be a bigger disruptor of the status quo.These are problems without easy solutions, but if Democrats cant fix this divide, they risk losing these voters in election years to come.This problem goes beyond blaming progressives for moving too far leftSince Harriss loss, a loud debate emerged among a class of political commentators and activists over how much blame largely urban progressive and activist groups should bear. Some liberals and moderates accused these groups of having pushed Democratic elected officials, candidates, strategists, and their staffers and campaigns too far to the left, thus missing a rightward shift by the electorate.The organizations Im describing cant be lumped in cleanly with these Groups even if they share some similarities. They wouldnt all call themselves progressive, or even explicitly Democratic. They dont all share the same policy goals or ideological vision. Theyre organized by chapter, like College Democrats, or as a network of smaller local groups, like the Alliance for Youth Action. Some are issue-specific, like the climate-focused Sunrise Movement, gun safety advocates of March for Our Lives, or immigrant-led, like United We Dream. Many got their start during the Trump era, during the rise and peak of resistance politics, especially the 2018 midterms. Others are newer, like Voters of Tomorrow or Gen Z for Change.Cumulatively, these youth organizers and activists made tens of millions of voter contacts during the 2024 cycle. They recruited thousands of volunteers to talk to neighbors and embed in their communities; they pushed for other organizations and formal party operations to dedicate resources and attention to young voters organizing calls and fundraisers to back Harris and Democratic candidates; and they garnered media attention and coverage for a segment of the electorate that isnt usually prioritized.The result of these efforts, along with the Harris campaigns own work, was paradoxical: relatively high youth voter turnout, especially in battlegrounds. But turnout didnt necessarily translate into a bigger Democratic advantage.The youth electorate was a lot more Republican than expectedThe best youth vote estimates we have, assembled from exit polls and AP VoteCast data by CIRCLE at Tufts, suggest that about 42 percent of young voters turned out in November, down from the slightly more than 50 percent who voted in the 2020 election. That comparison should be taken with caution: 2020 was a historic year of turnout across all segments of the electorate, while the 2024 level is more even with turnout in the 2016 presidential election.CIRCLE estimates also indicate that young voters were a smaller share of the electorate in 2024 than in 2016 or 2020, meaning that the vote preferences of other age cohorts were probably more influential in sealing a Democratic defeat.Still, there were significant education, gender, and geographical divides among youth. Young men backed Trump by a 14-point margin, while young women backed Harris by a 17-point margin a 31-point gap. Youth without college degrees and those living in rural areas backed Trump by double digits, while those with some college education and in urban places backed Harris by similar margins. But under those numbers are significant shifts toward Trump since 2020: Young white men shifted by 22 points, young white women shifted by 15 points, and young Latino men shifted by 38 points.On top of that, the pre-election polls of young voters issue priorities turned out to be right: They overwhelmingly ranked the economy, abortion, and immigration as their top priorities, per results from a post-election survey conducted by Navigator Research and shared with Vox. Those who cared the most about the economy and immigration broke heavily for Trump, and there were simply more of these voters than those who cared most about abortion or who trusted Democrats to handle the first two issues.Why the youth groups missed this In my conversations with youth organizers and experts, they offer a few different reasons for the gap between their work and these results. Some make a similar argument to the case against other advocacy groups, that Harris and national Democrats were dealing with the baggage of appearing too progressive, too liberal, or out of the cultural mainstream, putting them out of step with the more conservative and moderate young voters that made up a larger part of the electorate this year. Others make the case that the party positioned itself as too moderate, moving too far to the right on Gaza, immigration, or climate policy, or abandoning a populist working-class message on the economy, giving young progressives less of a reason to turn out.But I can tease out three structural reasons these youth vote groups might have struggled.First, there was an overarching mismatch between the kind of people doing this youth outreach work and the kind of people they needed to persuade.While not all of these youth activists and their organizations are the same, they do tend to take positions to the left of the mainstream Democratic Party and of the electorate at large. They are run by college students, recent graduates, or high school volunteers who might aspire to run for office themselves, or at least work in government. Much of their membership and leadership is hoping to continue to be involved in electoral politics or issue advocacy as they grow older. And they are active news consumers and political junkies.That level of education, ideological bent, political aspiration, urban residency, and engagement with political news and information makes them ontologically different from the average zoomer, who, if not conservative, has always tended to lean more centrist or ideologically moderate than is assumed, probably is not attending a prestigious or selective university (if they were working toward a college degree at all), and is not particularly attuned to political developments.Those who lead and staff these organizations also likely have stronger attitudes about Trump than many of the young people they were trying to reach. Trump played a much more antagonistic role in the political memory of those who started and grew many of these youth-focused organizations, Rachel Janfaza, a Gen Z political analyst and writer who covered young voters extensively in the 2024 cycle, told me.The genesis of these groups was, in large part, in 2018, 2020, or 2022, and at the time, there was a ton of energy and excitement around them, especially online, from a vocal cohort of young people who grew up during Trumps first term in office and who were part of the resistance movement pushing back against many of the actions he took during his first term in office, Janfaza said. Their issue advocacy, their focus on registering and turning out voters, and their understanding of Trump resulted in a series of wins: the blue wave of 2018, Bidens victory, and better-than-expected 2022 midterms.But the 2024 youth electorate was drastically different more conservative, more Republican, less engaged and influenced by pandemic shutdowns and the decentering of Trump as the central figure in American politics.I dont think we can overstate that they lived lives locked down, scrolling endlessly on social media, and when they came back to whether it was high school or college the set of social parameters, world events, and style of communication looks really different than it looked for some of the older members of Gen Z who grew up during the time of the March for Our Lives, climate strikes, and the Black Lives Matter movement, Janfaza said.Current and former members of these organizations dont disagree with this assessment. They agree that they arent necessarily a perfect stand-in for the average young eligible voter.Young voters, [who are often] first-time voters, are less likely to be consuming a ton of political media, theyre not as familiar with policy, they have a lot to figure out, and are thinking about some of these things for the first time, Jessica Siles, the deputy press secretary for Voters of Tomorrow, told me.This divide led to a second kind of mismatch. Youth organizations and their members doubled down on talking about issues, including Republican threats to reproductive rights; Trumps disregard for democratic norms and doubling down on stolen election and authoritarian rhetoric; and action on climate change, gun safety, and social justice. They thought and had reason to believe, based on polling and qualitative research these were topics young people cared about, and they hoped their focus on them could be enough to overcome discontent with the status quo. Sure, they talked about the economy, about inflation, and about Harriss policy vision for a new way forward, but some were hampered by their previous support of Biden, by being unable to present a case for Harris freed from Trump, or by doubling down on talk about jobs created, low unemployment, or rising wages, when that wasnt what young people believed.All this made it more difficult to talk about campaign issues with voters who were distrustful of Democrats and not necessarily convinced to care more about issues other than the economy.In polling they conducted, in conversations they were having with young voters, and in focus group sessions, an overwhelming majority of young people brought up economic concerns as being top of mind, even if they didnt disagree with a more progressive or traditionally Democratic position on other issues, Siles, and others, like Denae vila-Dickson of Sunrise, told me. These young voters specifically meant prices of everyday goods, affordability, and the overall cost of living, but these groups followed the cues of national Democrats, who spent much of 2024 talking about job creation, wage growth, and abstract economic indicators, along with other social and cultural issues.Early on, we were hearing young people telling us that they were struggling to afford rent and groceries, they were concerned about their job prospects, vila-Dickson told me. We tied [climate advocacy] to the jobs aspect. We talked about how JD Vance and Donald Trump were going to cut green jobs and cut energy programs that were going to raise prices.Siles similarly told me that, in retrospect, her organization faced a challenge in trying to talk about economic issues with a cohort of voters that were severely distrustful of the Democratic Party brand. Talking about Biden and Harriss accomplishments, about jobs and the growing economy, fell on deaf ears for the kind of voters they were encountering, who saw Harris as too linked to the past.Young voters were looking at renting for the first time, trying to pick a school perhaps thats affordable, or to not go to school and pursue something else, she said. We knew that the economy was the top issue for young voters and Gen Zers, and we knew that a lot of Gen Z voters have a lot of valid skepticism with the status quo and with the Democratic Party. There was one more structural limit to how much persuasion and campaigning these organizers could do online or through earned and paid media and advertising. Though it was hard to realize at the time, much of the messaging, digital organizing, and campaign outreach these youth groups were doing was happening in digital echo chambers.Liberal and progressive influencers, celebrity endorsers, memes, and digital messaging may only have been reaching like-minded people, who didnt need much work to be convinced to vote at all and to vote for Harris. Here, the Brat summer and coconut-tree memes that filled social media in July and early August function as an easy stand-in. While it felt like the memes and jokes were ubiquitous, saturating young people everywhere, they may have only served to entertain and encourage those users who were already predisposed to like the Democrats or view Harris positively. Polls during the late summer and fall showed just a fraction of the electorate viewed these memes positively, if theyd seen them at all.If youre a young person whos beyond the DC or political bubble, you probably werent seeing that in the kind of way that those of us who are heavily involved in politics were, Janfaza told me. Its also worth noting that the people who were seeing that content or whose feeds were enveloped with that content were probably a particular type of person, whereas, people in other parts of the country were not having that same online experience.These digital echo chambers also limited the reach of these youth groups, a disjuncture made worse by Trump and his campaigns ability to reach disengaged young people. Some organizers told me it felt as though their attempts to reach apathetic or lower-informed youth were overwhelmed by Trumps persona and presence.We need to make sure its going wider than I think it has been and that were breaking out of peoples echo chambers and reaching people that might not have otherwise been introduced to political media, Siles told me. And I think that thats something that, unfortunately, Trump did pretty well. He went on with some of these less-political influencers, on podcasts, and made these media appearances, and I think had just a bit of a wider reach online.These divides between the broader youth electorate and youth activists and campaigners arent etched in stone. In my conversations, young activists were self-reflective on what went wrong, what could have been changed, and how hopeful they are that they can improve and build on their work. Most told me that their organizations must continue to grow and diversify their ranks to include and incorporate young Americans of different socioeconomic backgrounds, educational levels, and ideological persuasions.They dont discard or devalue the work they did and there were surely effects in battleground states, where the limited data we have shows that the swings away from Democrats among young people were not as drastic. They acknowledge they must develop better ways to speak to youth who may be predisposed not to care about politics, political parties, and candidates, and those who are skeptical about voting at all.But there are serious trade-offs ahead. While younger Americans are still more likely to back liberal or progressive policies than older generations of Americans, that doesnt mean theyll back Democrats. Sure, Gen Z, as a whole, is far more likely to identify as Democratic and liberal than older cohorts, and young people of color are more likely to lean left than their white peers. But the 2024 results suggest that a generational shake-up is underway.Indeed, though support for liberal social policies and cultural positions is high among young people, theres a significant amount of persuasion and rebuilding of trust that Democrats and their allied youth groups will have to do in the next four years. Trumps popularity continues to grow; the most recent polling from the Economist and YouGov shows Trumps favorability highest among Americans ages 18 to 29: half approve of him, with just 43 percent viewing him negatively.And theyll have to dig themselves out of a hole even with the young people who could be expected to be the Democratic Partys future. Young Black voters, CIRCLE analysis shows, were much more likely to vote for Trump in 2024 than older Black voters: Trump won 23 percent of Black voters 18 to 29 compared to 6 percent of those over 65. Young AAPI and Hispanic voters also broke for Harris, but at much smaller margins than they backed Biden in 2020.That persuasion element will be important in future elections as the preeminence of economic concerns among Gen Zers in the 2024 election doesnt mean these youth dont care about climate change, racial justice, student loan relief, reproductive rights, gun safety, or immigrant justice. The young electorate that turned out simply prioritized economic concerns and a rejection of the status quo over appeals made based on abortion rights, climate concerns, or social justice.When it comes to talking about the economy, these groups are also learning lessons. Youth activists needed to understand that large numbers of young people dont trust what Democrats say about economic policy, Siles, of Voters of Tomorrow, told me. We needed to take that into account a little bit more during the persuasion stage, and be a little bit more bold and direct and simple and easy to understand for a lot of these young first-time voters, she said. Our conversations [since the election] are more now how can we do a better job of executing and implementing that kind of messaging and persuasion instead of just assuming young people turning out will trust Democrats.Rebuilding and making new connections with these voters will inevitably set up one more divide: between these youth activists and the established Democratic leaders they hope to emulate or replace. Young activists and youth leaders trying to get ahead in Democratic politics have an incentive not to rock the boat, to not confront or speak truthfully to the party establishment. Inevitably, tough conversations will have to happen.Including young people is not just including people who are young, it is about including a wide range of young people who represent ideological and all types of diversity in Gen Z, and oftentimes that requires going out of your way to talk to people and listen to the voices that arent necessarily coming forward and telling you youre doing things right, Aidan Kohn-Murphy, a founder of Gen-Z for Change, told me. People who are eager to tell you that youre doing things right will always tell you that.The coming months will test whether these youth-focused groups can find a way to inspire trust in Democratic leaders, figure out how to escape digital and media echo chambers, and, perhaps more importantly, expand their ranks to incorporate differing perspectives even if doing all this changes their relationship with Democratic powerbrokers.See More: