The Supreme Court handed down a very brief order on Friday, which effectively permits the Trump administration to strip half a million immigrants of their right to remain in the United States. The case is Noem v. Doe.Although the full Court did not explain why it reached this decision, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson penned a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. As Jackson explains, the case involves “nearly half a million Cuban, Haitian, Nicaraguan, and Venezuelan noncitizens” who are in the United States “after fleeing their home countries.” The Department of Homeland Security previously granted these immigrants “parole” status, which allows them to live in the United States for up to two years, and sometimes to work in this country lawfully. Shortly after Trump entered office, DHS issued a blanket order stripping these immigrants of their parole status, putting them at risk for removal. But, a federal district court blocked that order — ruling that DHS must decide whether each individual immigrant should lose their status on a case-by-case basis, rather than through an en masse order.Realistically, this district court order was unlikely to remain in effect indefinitely. In its brief to the justices, the Trump administration makes a strong argument that its decision to terminate these immigrants’ status is legal, or, at least, that the courts cannot second-guess that decision. Among other things, the brief points to a federal law which provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review” certain immigration-related decisions by the secretary of Homeland Security. And it argues that the secretary has the power to grant or deny parole because federal law gives them “discretion” over who receives parole.Notably, Jackson’s dissent does not question that the Trump administration is likely to prevail once this case is fully litigated. Instead, she argues that her Court’s decision to effectively strip these immigrants of their status is premature. “Even if the Government is likely to win on the merits,” Jackson writes, “in our legal system, success takes time and the stay standards require more than anticipated victory.”The primary disagreement between Jackson and her colleagues in the majority concerns the Court’s aggressive use of its “shadow docket” to benefit Trump and other conservative litigants. The shadow docket is a mix of emergency motions and other expedited matters that the justices decide without full briefing and oral argument. The Court typically only spends days or maybe a few weeks weighing whether to grant shadow docket relief, while it spends months or longer deciding cases on its ordinary docket.Since Jackson joined the Court in 2022, she’s become the Court’s most vocal internal critic of its frequent use of the shadow docket.As Jackson correctly notes in her Doe dissent, the Supreme Court has long said that a party seeking a shadow docket order blocking a lower court’s decision must do more than demonstrate that they are likely to prevail. That party must also show that “irreparable harm will befall them should we deny the stay.” When these two factors do not strongly tilt toward one party, the Court is also supposed to ask whether “the equities and public interest” favor the party seeking a stay.Jackson criticizes her colleagues in the majority for abandoning these requirements. As she argues, the Trump administration has not shown an “urgent need to effectuate blanket…parole terminations now.” She also argues that DHS “does not identify any specific national-security threat or foreign-policy problem that will result” if these immigrants remain in the country for a few more months. And, even under the lower court’s order, the government “retains the ability to terminate…parole on a case-by-case basis should such a particular need arise.”Although the Court has never formally repudiated the requirement that parties seeking to stay a lower court order must prove irreparable harm, it often hands down shadow docket decisions that don’t explicitly consider this requirement. Concurring in Labrador v. Poe (2024), Justice Brett Kavanaugh argued that, in many shadow docket cases, “this Court has little choice but to decide the emergency application by assessing likelihood of success on the merits.” So Kavanaugh, at least, has stated openly that there are some cases where he will rule solely based on which side he thinks should win, regardless of whether that side has proven irreparable harm. Kavanaugh’s concurring opinion was joined by Justice Amy Coney Barrett.In the short term, the Doe decision could lead to many immigrants losing their protections. Long term, the most significant aspect of the decision involves an internal dispute about how fast the Court may move when it disagrees with a lower court decision. No justice contested that the Trump administration is eventually likely to prevail in this case. But Jackson called for her Court to continue to apply procedural constraints that a majority of her colleagues appear to have abandoned. The upshot of this abandonment is that right-leaning litigants like Trump are likely to receive relief very quickly from the justices, because most of the justices are Republicans, while left-leaning litigants will remain bound by lower court orders.See More:

A leaker has broken from the pack, and is now saying that the core iPhone 17 will stick with the already released A18 chip, while the rest of the line gets chips derived from the A19.Renders of possible iPhone 17 designs based on previous leaksIt's generally accepted by the vast majority of leakers that the entire iPhone 17 line, including the iPhone 17, iPhone Air, and iPhone 17 Pro, will boast the A19 chip, with varying amounts of RAM.Now in a new note to investors, Jeff Pu from GF Securities is recanting one of his previous reports. He is now going against every other leaker in saying that the core iPhone 17 will stick with the A18 processor found in the iPhone 16 lineup. Rumor Score: 🤔 Possible Continue Reading on AppleInsider | Discuss on our Forums

On Thursday evening, the Supreme Court handed down a brief order, which temporarily permits President Donald Trump to fire two federal officials who, by law, are shielded from being summarily terminated. That, in itself, is not particularly significant because, on April 9, Chief Justice John Roberts acted on his own authority to temporarily permit Trump to fire the same two officials. So the practical effect of Thursday’s order in Trump v. Wilcox is simply to maintain the status quo.That said, the Thursday order does contain some important new information from the Court’s Republican majority. While the Republican justices have signaled for quite some time that they are eager to give the president broad authority to fire officials that Congress intended to insulate from presidential control, the order includes a paragraph signaling that they will not allow Trump to fire members of the Federal Reserve.From a legal perspective, the paragraph is difficult to parse. And, as Justice Elena Kagan writes in a dissenting opinion, is not supported by the legal authority it cites. But it is likely to reassure investors that, while the Supreme Court does appear eager to expand Trump’s authority over previously independent parts of the federal government, it won’t permit him to disrupt the Fed’s ability to make technocratic decisions about interest rates. The immediate stakes in Wilcox involve a former member of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which enforces labor laws and adjudicates union-related disputes, along with a former member of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), which hears disputes claiming that a civil servant’s employment protections were violated. Trump fired both shortly after taking office, despite the fact that federal law only permits them to be fired for some sort of neglect or malfeasance.The NLRB and the MSPB, moreover, are just two of an array of “independent” agencies led by multi-member boards, whose members all enjoy similar employment protections – agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Federal Reserve.For at least 15 years, when the Court handed down Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Board (2010), a majority of the justices have signaled that they are eager to strip Congress of its authority to create such independent agencies, and give the president full authority to fire these agencies’ leaders at will. Many economists and investors, meanwhile, have warned that it would be particularly dangerous to strip the Federal Reserve — which is supposed to set interest rates based on delicate economic calculations and not based on what will benefit the sitting president — of its independence, as doing so could throw the US economy into chaos.Thursday’s order is a clear signal that the Court has heard these concerns and does not intend to eliminate the Fed’s independence. It is unlikely to satisfy many constitutional scholars, as its explanation for why Federal Reserve leaders should be treated differently than the leaders of any other independent agency is so baffling that it appears contrived. Regardless of the underlying reasoning, however, the order does strongly suggest that this Court will not give Trump full control over the Fed.The “unitary executive,” briefly explainedTrump v. Wilcox is the culmination of a longstanding grudge many Republican legal elites hold against Humphrey’s Executor v. United States (1935), the Supreme Court case establishing that Congress may create independent agencies whose members may only be fired for cause. Though the leaders of these agencies are typically nominated by the president for a term of several years, and confirmed by the Senate, Humphrey’s Executor explained that laws protecting them from being fired while in office are supposed to ensure that they “act with entire impartiality,” and “exercise the trained judgment of a body of experts.”All six of the Court’s Republicans, however, have made it clear they believe in a theory known as the “unitary executive,” which is incompatible with Humphrey’s Executor.The Constitution provides that “the executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.” In a 1988 dissenting opinion, which many legal conservatives now treat as if it were a holy text, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that “this does not mean some of the executive power, but all of the executive power.” And thus, if a federal official is charged with executing federal laws in some way, they must be fully subject to presidential control.If you take this unitary executive theory seriously, then there should be no doubt that Federal Reserve governors may be fired at will by the president. The Fed’s authority over interest rates, after all, derives from federal statutes instructing it to pursue the dual goals of “maximum employment” and “stable prices.” So the Fed is charged with executing federal laws.But the consequences of stripping the Fed of its independence could be catastrophic. In 1971, President Richard Nixon pressured Fed chair Arthur Burns to lower interest rates in advance of Nixon’s reelection race — the idea was to juice the economy right while voters were weighing Nixon’s record — and Burns complied. In the short term, this worked out great for Nixon. The economy boomed in 1972, and Nixon won reelection by a historic landslide. But Burns’s action is often blamed for years of “stagflation,” slow economic growth combined with high inflation, in the 1970s.The Fed, in other words, has the power to effectively inject cocaine into the US economy – giving it a temporary boost that can be timed to benefit incumbent presidents, at the cost of much greater economic turmoil down the road. It’s not hard to see how presidents could abuse their power if they can fire members of the Federal Reserve who refuse to give the economy such a temporary and costly high.One might think that these risks would be enough to caution the justices against overruling Humphrey’s Executor. But the Republican justices appear quite committed to the unitary executive theory, and they have been that way for quite some time. (If you want to know more about why they feel this way, I can refer you to three separate explainers I’ve written on this subject.)And so those justices spend the bulk of Thursday’s Wilcox order laying out the process they are likely to use to formally overrule Humphrey’s Executor. The order announces that the Trump administration is “likely” to prevail in its bid to fire NLRB and MSPB officials, and it temporarily blocks lower court decisions that reinstated the two officials at issue in this case. But the Court puts off the question of whether to formally repudiate Humphrey’s Executor until after the ordinary appeals process plays out and the justices receive full briefing and oral argument on whether to do so — which could happen as soon as the Court’s next term.The Wilcox order’s language protecting the Fed is gobbledygookEmbedded within all this language laying out the process to challenge Humphrey’s Executor is the paragraph indicating that the Fed is safe. While the two fired officials “contend that arguments in this case necessarily implicate the constitutionality of for-cause removal protections for members of the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors or other members of the Federal Open Market Committee,” the order states, “we disagree.”The justices who joined the order then offer a single sentence explaining why: “The Federal Reserve is a uniquely structured, quasi-private entity that follows in the distinct historical tradition of the First and Second Banks of the United States.”It’s certainly possible to parse the components of this sentence. The description of the Fed as a “quasi-private entity,” for example, may refer to the fact that much of the Fed’s authority is wielded through regional entities, which are themselves controlled by board members who are mostly selected by commercial banks. But it is hardly unusual for members of the private sector to be given a formal role within government — just ask Elon Musk. Indeed, the Supreme Court heard at least two cases this spring involving the role experts from the private sector may play in setting government policy.The “First and Second Banks of the United States” are 18th- and early 19th-century predecessors to the Fed. The Supreme Court upheld Congress’s power to create national banks in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), but the nation abandoned national banking under President Andrew Jackson, setting off a period of economic turmoil, including an economic depression shortly after Jackson left office.But it’s unclear what any of this has to do with the president’s powers as outlined in the Constitution. If the theory of the unitary executive is correct, then no entity — regardless of whether it is “quasi-private” or is part of a “distinct historical tradition” involving banks — may execute federal laws, unless that entity is controlled by people who are themselves under presidential control. As a legal matter, the Court’s explanation of why the Fed is special is nothing more than word salad.The only legal authority that the Wilcox order cites to support its claim that the Fed is special is a footnote in its pro-unitary executive decision in Seila Law v. CFPB (2020). But nothing in that footnote provides any support for this claim.As Kagan points out in her dissent in Wilcox, the only relevant language in that footnote is a throwaway line responding to her partial dissent in Seila Law. Kagan had argued that “federal regulators” historically have enjoyed some insulation from the president. The footnote dismisses this argument, stating that even “assuming financial institutions like the Second Bank and the Federal Reserve can claim a special historical status,” the agency at issue in Seila Law does not qualify.The Court, in other words, waved away Kagan’s argument that institutions like the Fed should be shielded from presidential control in Seila Law. Now, however, the justices in the majority appear to be signaling they believe there is some merit to Kagan’s argument.If the Court does formally overrule Humphrey’s Executor in the coming months, the justices in the majority will likely elaborate on why a different rule should apply to the Fed. The best reading of the Wilcox order’s one paragraph about the Fed is that a majority of the justices have already decided that they want to protect it, and they would now like some smart lawyers to file briefs coming up with an argument for that position — one that uses terms like “quasi-private” and that refers to the early history of national banking.Of course, this is not how the law is supposed to work — judges are not supposed to start with the outcome that they want and then invite members of the bar to explain how to get there. But this also will hardly be the first time that the Roberts Court started with its intended outcome and reasoned backward to get there. It’s just being more transparent this time around.See More:

There are no heroes in Libby v. Fecteau, a decision about an anti-trans lawmaker that the Supreme Court handed down on Tuesday. With only two justices publicly dissenting, the Court handed down a brief order temporarily lifting sanctions against that lawmaker.The lawmaker at the heart of the case, Maine Republican Rep. Laurel Libby, was sanctioned by her colleagues for posting an unblurred picture of a transgender high school athlete, along with the student’s name and the name of her school, in order to protest against including transgender girls in women’s sports. The sanction those colleagues imposed on her could not possibly be constitutional: They effectively stripped her of her right to vote on legislation as a member of Maine’s House of Representatives, stripping Libby’s constituents of their representation in the state House. And Libby’s fellow lawmakers likely also violated her First Amendment rights in the process. As a legal matter, Libby closely resembles Bond v. Floyd (1966), a case brought by a Georgia state lawmaker who was not allowed to take his seat in the state legislature — ostensibly because his colleagues objected to his opposition to the Vietnam War. Bond held that the First Amendment “requires that legislators be given the widest latitude to express their views on issues of policy.”To be sure, no moral comparisons can be drawn between the plaintiffs in Bond and Libby. Bond involved Rep. Julian Bond, a Black man and a prominent civil rights activist who was elected to the Georgia legislature just as Jim Crow was beginning to lose its grip on the South. Libby, by contrast, arises out of Libby’s decision to bully a high school student.But the First Amendment protects offensive speech just as surely as it protects speech that is now widely viewed as prescient and wise. Indeed, nearly all First Amendment cases arise out of speech that someone in a position of power deemed offensive — why else would they have tried to censure or ban that speech?After Libby posted the picture of the high school student on Facebook, Maine House Speaker Ryan Fecteau asked her to take it down due to concerns “that publicizing the student’s identity would threaten the student’s health and safety.” When Libby refused, the state House passed a resolution formally censuring her — which, under the Maine House’s rules, meant that Libby “may not be allowed to vote or speak” on the House floor until she apologizes for the conduct that resulted in her censure. Libby refuses to apologize, which means that her constituents effectively do not have representation in the state House, at least with respect to bills that receive a vote on the floor.The Supreme Court’s order in the Libby case is very brief and does not explain why the justices decided to reinstate Libby’s floor privileges. Notably, however, none of the justices defended the state legislature’s decision to strip Libby of her voting rights.The Court’s order includes a single line noting that Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, but Sotomayor did not explain why. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, meanwhile, penned a brief dissenting opinion which largely criticizes her colleagues for overusing the Court’s “shadow docket” — a mix of emergency motions and other matters that the Court decides without full briefing and oral argument. It was on this docket that Libby was heard.As Jackson notes, the Court used to be exceedingly reluctant to rule in favor of parties that seek shadow docket relief — she quotes Justice Potter Stewart’s 1968 warning that such relief “should be used sparingly and only in the most critical and exigent circumstances.” And Jackson, who emerged as the Court’s most outspoken opponent of the shadow docket after she became a justice in 2022, is right that the Court’s practices have changed dramatically in recent years. Prior to the first Trump administration, Supreme Court decisions on the shadow docket were exceedingly rare outside of death penalty cases, where the justices often had to act right away to prevent an execution from moving forward before they could review the case.But, regardless of whether the justices should have acted as quickly as they did — or, as Jackson suggests, waited until the lower courts had fully considered this case before stepping in — there’s little doubt that Libby should have prevailed eventually. Libby’s constituents have a right to representation, regardless what views their representative holds.And, if lawmakers were allowed to strip their colleagues of their voting rights at will, there’s no guarantee that another legislature would not use that power to target elected officials who, like Bond, can more easily claim the moral high ground than Libby.See More: